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PROF. FELSENFELD: I would like to welcome you here this 
morning to Fordham Law School.5  My name is Carl Felsenfeld.  I am 
the Director of the Financial Services Institute, which is one of the 
sponsors of today’s program, along with K&L Gates6 and the American 
Antitrust Institute7 in Washington. 
I would like to mention two major events.  One is the United States 
Supreme Court case United States v. Philadelphia National Bank in 
1963,8 that held, among other things, that banks are subject to the 
antitrust laws in their merger activities and that banking is essentially a 
local business.9  The Philadelphia National Bank case was strict in their 
antitrust considerations. 
We jump ahead thirty-one years, when the Riegle-Neal Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 was enacted.10  That, for the first 
time, enabled banks in the United States generally to go interstate.11  
That led, of course, to the mammoth mergers that we have seen, which 
brings antitrust laws to mind. 
What I have seen since 1994 is that the number one bank in the 
country will merge with the number five bank in the country and create 
a multi-state institution, with billions of dollars in assets, and if it is 
found to violate the antitrust laws, the solution is to knock off half a 
dozen branches in the Peoria area or something like that, which makes 
me wonder: Do we really have an effective law of antitrust for banks?  I 
hope the discussion today will consider that. 
With that, I just want to thank the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law12 for all their help.  Doug, why don’t I turn it over to you.  
It’s your program. 
 
 5. For more information, please visit the Fordham University School of Law 
website, http://law.fordham.edu (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).  
 6. For more information, please visit the K&L Gates website, 
http://www.klgates.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
 7. For more information, please visit the American Antitrust Institute website, 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
 8. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 9. Id. at 325. 
 10. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 11. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831u (1999) (codification of § 102(a) of the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994). 
 12. For more information, please visit the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law website, http://law.fordham.edu/jcfl.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
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MR. BRODER: Thank you, Carl. 
Good morning.  My name is Doug Broder.  I’m the co-head of the 
Antitrust Group at K&L Gates, resident here in New York.  Our panel 
this morning is going to discuss the substantive competitive analysis of 
bank mergers.  We have two very distinguished and knowledgeable 
panelists who are going to talk to us about this subject. 
Bert Foer is the President of the American Antitrust Institute in 
Washington, a nonprofit think tank focused on antitrust issues.13  Bert’s 
career has included both private law practice, at Hogan & Hartson and 
Jackson & Campbell, and government service, as the Assistant Director 
and the Acting Deputy Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition.14  
While at the FTC, Bert was a commissioner on the National 
Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers.15  Bert also served in the 
private sector as the CEO of a chain of jewelry stores for twelve years.16  
Bert is a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, has an A.B. 
from Brandeis and an M.A. in political science from Washington 
University.17  Bert is going to focus on the legal analysis of mergers. 
Anne Gron is a senior consultant in the Securities and Finance 
Practice of NERA Economic Consulting.18  Anne has conducted 
research on, among other things, the effect of regulation in banking and 
insurance, and the effect of bank portfolio composition on lending.19  
Before joining NERA, Anne was an assistant professor at the Kellogg 
School of Management, after beginning her career as an assistant 
professor at the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business.20  
Anne received her Ph.D. in economics from MIT, after graduating from 
Williams College with a degree in economics and computer science.21  
Anne, logically enough, will focus on the economic side of bank merger 
analysis. 
 13. American Antitrust Institute, Our People: Officers, Directors, Fellows, and the 
Advisory Board, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/About_Us/People/index.ashx (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. NERA Economic Consulting, Experts, http://www.nera.com/Expert.asp?e_ID= 
1482 (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
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Before I turn things over to Bert and Anne, I would like to briefly 
outline the statutory and regulatory context within which bank mergers 
are analyzed.  Generally, the basic law that governs merger analysis in 
the antitrust laws is the Clayton Act, section 7, which outlaws mergers 
and acquisitions “the effect of which may be to substantially lessen 
competition or create a monopoly.”22  Enforcement of section 7 is 
invested primarily in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and 
specifically in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and in 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and its Competition Bureau.23
The way mergers get analyzed now, since 1976, under the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act, is under a regime of pre-merger notification.24  
Anytime two or more parties are planning an acquisition or a transaction 
of a certain size—the current threshold is about $60 million—they are 
required to notify the DOJ and the FTC of their planned transaction, and 
then wait thirty days while the agencies take a preliminary look at the 
proposed transaction to see whether there may be a competitive antitrust 
problem under section 7.25  If the agencies decide there is not, the parties 
can go ahead and close at the end of that thirty-day waiting period.26  
Otherwise, the agencies may seek additional information and extend the 
waiting period until thirty days after obtaining that information from the 
parties.27
The agencies do not have self-executing power to block a proposed 
transaction.28  They have to convince a federal court that the proposed 
transaction would violate section 7.29  If they can do that, they can get a 
preliminary, and ultimately a permanent, injunction against the 
transaction.30  More often than not, when there is an investigation and 
the agencies have a problem with a proposed transaction, they can come 
up with a settlement with the parties that allows the transaction to go 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. § 18a(a). 
 25. See id. § 18a(a)-(b).  On February 28, 2008, the thresholds for all Hart-Scott-
Rodino transactions increased, the threshold referenced in the text increased to $63.1 
million. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REVISED JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLDS FOR 
SECTION 7A OF THE CLAYTON ACT 1 (2008). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 18f. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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forward, subject to some kind of remedy in the form of divestiture or, 
perhaps, a conduct remedy.31
Bank mergers are subject to similar, but not identical, procedures.  
Bank mergers are analyzed under section 7, but with a difference.  The 
relevant statutes are the Bank Merger Acts of 1960 and 1966 and the 
Bank Holding Company Act.32  For the most part, bank mergers do not 
require notification under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, but that’s because 
they require approval from one of several regulatory agencies—the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, the FDIC, or the Office of Thrift Supervision—depending on 
what category the merging banks fall into.33  The banks file notice for 
approval with those agencies.34  The agencies notify the DOJ, which 
weighs in with its thoughts on the competitive analysis of the proposed 
merger.35
On the substantive side, though, there is a key distinction applied to 
the analysis of bank mergers under the Bank Merger Act.  The Act 
requires the regulator who is making the decision to take into account 
the Clayton section 7 standard that says the transaction should be 
disapproved if it would violate section 7, unless—and here is the 
important caveat—”the anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable 
effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the 
community to be served.”36
With that, I will turn it over to Bert. 
MR. FOER: Thank you, Doug.  Thank you all for coming out 
today. 
 31. See Paul J. Stancil, Atomism and the Private Merger Challenge, 78 TEMP. L. 
REV. 949, 969 (2005). 
 32. Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129; Bank Merger Act 
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7; Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. 
No. 110-131, 70 Stat. 133 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Bank Holding 
Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 33. See Jonathan R. Macey, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for 
Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1215-23 (1988) (discussing the regulatory 
scheme of banks under the various acts). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2007). 
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How many know what the Herfindahl37 is?  I will be focusing 
primarily on the market definition and concentration issues that are 
before us. 
It was about thirty years ago, in October of 1977, that the National 
Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers issued its report.38  I was the 
FTC’s representation, one of twenty-six commissioners.  We were 
dealing then with the emerging technology of automated teller machines 
and debit cards.39  It was a very forward-looking report.  It set forth a 
program intended to maximize both consumer protection and 
competition for this unfolding industry.40
Congress quickly, and maybe surprisingly, enacted most of what we 
had proposed.41  In retrospect, the EFT Commission served the country 
unusually well for a statutory study commission.  We saw then that there 
were thousands of banks in the country, mostly small, but that local 
banking tended to be rather concentrated.  We believed, as a 
commission, that consumers would benefit from fewer and larger banks 
more directly in competition with one another.42
How do banks compete?  Let’s start there. 
Bank pricing includes a combination of interest rates and fees.  
There is non-price competition also, and that focuses on location, 
customer service, alternative delivery channels, the set of products being 
offered, brand recognition, and relationship competition.43  To make a 
couple of quick generalizations: (1) Large banks often face each other in 
multiple markets,44 which might temper their aggressiveness; (2) The 
 37. Herfindahl refers to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a commonly 
accepted measure of market concentration. See David J. Saylor, Cable Television Law 
2008: Competition in Video, Internet & Telephony, 925 PLI/PAT. 423, 444 (2008). 
 38. NAT’L COMM’N ON ELEC. FUND TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED STATES: 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NAT’L COMM’N ON ELEC. FUND TRANSFERS 1 (1977) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
 39. Id. 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1978). 
 42. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 12-13.
 43. See John T. Scott, Nonprice Competition in Banking Markets, 44 S. ECON. J. 
594 (1978). 
 44. Compare Bank of America, Global Reach, http://corp.bankofamerica.com/pub 
lic/public.portal?_pd_page_label=products/regions/emea (last visited Mar. 1, 2008), 
with Citigroup, Global Locations, http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup/global/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2008) (Note that both banks have branches in the same locations, 
indicating competition with each other in multiple markets.). 
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presence or threat of a large bank may inhibit the pricing of a local 
dominant bank;45 (3) Small banks are less profitable than large ones, but 
beyond something like $50 billion in assets, profitability declines, 
suggesting that the largest mergers may not gain much in the way of 
economies of scale.46
Because of the risks to individuals and to the economy, banking has 
been among the most regulated of American industries.47  However, the 
amount of regulation has decreased since the 1970s.  After the EFT 
report—but surely not because of it—many restrictions on banking, such 
as branching and interstate banking, were lifted.48  By 1995, all states 
allowed interstate banking, and by 1994, only two states prohibited 
statewide branching.49
Extensive consolidation was occurring in the 1980s and 1990s.  
There were some very large deals, like NationsBank joining with Bank 
of America.50  These were common.  Today it is estimated that 630 
financial holding companies control over 970 banks and 84% of all 
banking assets in the U.S.51  Most of the rest operate as members of one 
of almost 5000 bank holding companies that account for 13% of the 
assets.52
 45. See ALLEN N. BERGER ET AL., DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND 
MONETARY AFFAIRS, FED. RESERVE BD., THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION FROM LARGE, 
MULTIMARKET FIRMS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF SMALL, SINGLE-MARKET FIRMS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE BANKING INDUSTRY 8-9 (2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/FEDS/2005/200515/200515pap.pdf. 
 46. See Statement of Janet L. Yellen, 81 Fed. Res. Bull. 1093, 1100-02 (1995). 
 47. See Duncan E. Alford, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision: An 
Enforceable International Financial Standard?, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 
237 (2005). 
 48. See generally Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 
J. LEGIS. 255 (1995) (providing a summary of the history of banking law). 
 49. See Thomas A. Garrett et al., A Spatial Analysis of State Banking Regulation 1 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2003-44C, 2003), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2003/2003-044.pdf (“By 1994, all states except Iowa 
permitted statewide branching through the acquisition of existing bank offices . . . [and] 
all states except Hawaii permitted some entry by out-of-state holding companies.”). 
 50. Michael J. de la Merced and Peter Edmonston, Builder of Sallie Mae Deal Has 
a Daring History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007, at C5. 
 51. OECD, Roundtable on Competition and Regulation in Retail Banking, at 4, 
DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2006)60, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/Banking_U 
S.pdf. 
 52. See id. 
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The large increase in concentration at the national level—aggregate 
concentration—has not been matched by increased concentration at the 
local level.  In fact, it appears that at the local level concentration, on 
average, has not changed very much.  This is both because the newer, 
larger banks were able to enter local markets through market-extension 
mergers and because entry conditions are such that many new banks 
were able to get started, even as old banks were failing or merging out of 
existence.  In other words, neither exit nor entry barriers seemed to be 
particularly high.  It has generally been the case that retail customers and 
small businesses utilize local commercial banks.53  Corporate banking is 
regional, national, and sometimes international. 
What are the effects of concentration in banking? 
Empirical analysis tends to indicate that bank efficiency is 
negatively correlated to concentration.54  Banks operating in more 
concentrated markets earn higher profits than banks operating in less 
concentrated markets.55  One can speculate that consolidation, in 
combination with technological advancement, has resulted in major 
efficiencies.  We can compare the automated teller machine with live 
tellers.  This combination of technology and consolidation has probably 
provided consumers with more choices than they had thirty years ago. 
Nonetheless, concentration in specific markets seems to have 
negative consequences.  This implies, first, that bank mergers will 
continue to be a concern for those who weigh the effects on competition.  
A second implication is that the starting point in any given competition 
analysis has to be finding what the relevant market is, since one cannot 
be concerned with concentration until there is a market in which 
participants can be counted and their shares can be evaluated.  
Aggregate concentration is interesting politically, but in specific markets 
that is where the effects of competition have to be analyzed. 
 53. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Two Few to Serve? The Potential 
Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1038-39 (1992) (“More than ninety 
percent of smaller firms rely on local commercial banks as their primary source of 
financial services . . . .”). 
 54. See Ash Demirgüç-Kunt et al., The Impact of Bank Regulations, Concentration, 
and Institutions on Bank Margins 27 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
3030, 2003), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3 
P/IB/2003/05/30/000094946_03052004111117/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 
 55. Id. 
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Bank regulating agencies have the jurisdiction to approve or deny a 
bank merger.56  By statute, probable competitive effects must be taken 
into account.57  If the merger is approved, the DOJ has thirty days to 
block it on antitrust grounds.58  Generally, there is staff cooperation 
between the DOJ and the regulatory agency during a simultaneous 
review.59  The DOJ applies the basic antitrust law and analysis used in 
other contexts, other industries, although there are a few banking 
wrinkles.60
The key statute is the Clayton Act, specifically section 7, which 
makes illegal those mergers whose effect may be substantially to lessen 
competition, in any line of commerce, in any section of the country.61  
The key Supreme Court case is United States v. Philadelphia National 
Bank.62  This 1963 landmark case involved a merger between the 
second- and third-largest of forty-two commercial banks in the 
Philadelphia metropolitan area.63  The lower court had held that section 
7 was not applicable to banks and that, in any event, the merger would 
not lessen competition.64  In its decision reversing this, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that there was a trend toward concentration in 
banking in Philadelphia.65  The Court held—and the author was Justice 
 56. See Gina M. Killian, Bank Mergers and the Department of Justice’s Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines: A Critique and Proposal, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 857, 857 (1994) 
(stating that “[t]he Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) and the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) are two agencies with regulatory jurisdiction over bank mergers.”). 
 57. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 334 (1963) (stating that in 
“the case of a merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption of liabilities, 
the appropriate agency shall also take into consideration the effect of the transaction on 
competition . . . .”). 
 58. See Killian, supra note 56, at 865. 
 59. See J. Robert Kramer II, Antitrust Review In Banking and Defense, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 111, 117 (2002) (stating that cooperation between the DOJ and Federal 
Reserve Board has grown, and that they “routinely hold joint meetings with the parties 
and collectively give parties feedback on competitive concerns”). 
 60. See Catherine M. Bejerana, Capitalist Manifesto: The Inadequacy of Antitrust 
Laws In Preventing the Cannibalism of Competition, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 144, 
160-63 (2001) (stating that “[t]he Department of Justice’s analysis for bank mergers is 
essentially similar to that of other industries” and providing the other laws and rules 
applicable to bank mergers). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996). 
 62. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 321. 
 63. Id. at 330. 
 64. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
 65. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 331 (stating that “the trend toward concentration 
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Brennan66—that bank mergers are covered by section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.67  Second, it held that the Bank Merger Act of 1960, which directed 
the banking agencies to consider competitive factors before approving 
mergers, did not immunize approved mergers from challenge under the 
federal antitrust laws.68  In other words, the DOJ could block a merger, 
even though the Comptroller approved it. 
Next, the Court turned to the lawfulness of the proposed merger 
under section 7.69  The first issue was to determine the line of 
commerce.70  That is a statutory line; we call it the relevant market, 
relevant product, or relevant geographic market.71  The section of the 
country is the relevant geographic market.72  These two aspects of a 
market definition interact. 
The Court agreed with the lower court’s finding that a cluster of 
products and services denoted by the term “commercial banking” 
constituted a distinct line of commerce.73  It disagreed, however, on the 
appropriate section of the country.74  In banking, the Court said, 
individuals and corporations typically confer the bulk of their patronage 
on banks in their local community.75  The four-county area in which the 
banks’ offices are located would seem to be the relevant geographic 
is noticeable in the Philadelphia area generally, in which the number of commercial 
banks has declined from 108 in 1947 to the present 42”). 
 66. Id. at 323. 
 67. See id. at 346. 
The stock-acquisition provision of Section 7, though reenacted in haec verba by the 
1950 amendment, must be deemed expanded in its new context to include, at the very 
least, acquisitions by merger or consolidation, transactions which entail a transfer of 
stock of the parties, while the assets-acquisition provision clearly reaches corporate 
acquisitions involving no such transfer. 
Id. 
 68. Id. at 350 (holding that the district court below was correct in rejecting the 
contention that the “[b]ank Merger Act, by directing the banking agencies to consider 
competitive factors before approving mergers immunizes approved mergers from 
challenge under the federal antitrust laws”) (citation omitted). 
 69. See id. at 355. 
 70. Id. at 356. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 357. 
 75. Id. at 358. 
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market in which the companies operate and the customers can 
practically turn for service.76
Finally, the Court turned to the prediction of a merger’s effect on 
competitive conditions.77  This is a prediction about the future; it has to 
be.  The purpose of section 7 is to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in 
their incipiency.78  In a key interpretation, Justice Brennan stated, 
Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm 
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market and 
results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that 
market is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that 
it must be enjoined, in the absence of evidence clearly showing that 
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.79
This structure-based test, the Court said, “is fully consonant with 
economic theory”; namely, that competition is more likely “to be 
greatest when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant 
market share.”80  The Court went on to convert these observations into 
some presumptions and presented a burden-shifting approach, a model, 
for how merger analysis should proceed.81
First, if the merger results in a bank controlling at least 30% of the 
market, there is a presumption of danger.82  Further, if there is an 
increase of more than 33% in concentration, this is significant.83  These 
structural indicia raise an inference of illegality, which can then be 
rebutted by the merging parties.84
In the case at hand, the Court dismissed the various rebuttal 
arguments that were put forward by the banks.85  Philadelphia National 
Bank’s emphasis on incipiency meant that merger analysis would focus 
on predicted future effects.86  Its emphasis on market structure meant 
 76. Id. at 359. 
 77. See id. at 362. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. at 363. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 363-64. 
 82. See id. at 364. 
 83. Id. at 365. 
 84. See id. at 363. 
 85. See id. at 370-73. 
 86. See id. at 362. 
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that measurements of concentration, which are highly dependent on 
market definition, would play the essential role.87
The focus on future effects was heightened by passage of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act in 1976.88  The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act has had a 
largely unanticipated effect of moving the merger law development and 
enforcement policy process from a regime of post hoc adjudication to 
pre hoc administration/negotiation.89  Today, relatively few mergers are 
actually litigated in court.90  A new body of administrative law has 
consequently evolved outside of the judiciary’s sight.  To a large extent, 
the antitrust treatment of mergers is driven by a step-by-step application 
of the principles in the horizontal merger guidelines.91
Philadelphia National Bank recognized that merging parties could, 
in theory, rebut the presumptions created by concentration, but it did not 
provide much hope that rebuttals would be found persuasive.92  This is 
what has changed since Philadelphia National Bank.  In one Supreme 
Court and several appellate cases, ease of entry and efficiencies have 
been allowed to rebut the structural presumption of harm.93  To an extent 
 87. See id. 
 88. See Susan Harriman, Note, Parens Patriae Actions on Behalf of Indirect 
Purchasers: Do They Survive Illinois Brick?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 184 (1982) (stating 
that one purpose of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was “to deter future antitrust violations” 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, at 3 (1975))). 
 89. Albert A. Foer, Toward Guidelines for Merger Remedies, 52 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 211, 212 (2001) (stating that the “Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
of 1976 (“HSR”) has had the largely unanticipated effect of moving the merger law 
development and enforcement policy process from a regime of post hoc adjudication to 
ad hoc regulation and pre hoc administrative negotiation”) (footnote omitted). 
 90. Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Cutting Edge 
Antitrust Conference Law Seminars International (Feb. 17, 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.shtm (stating that “few merger cases are 
fully litigated in the United States courts or the FTC’s administrative process”). 
 91. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 6:6 (West 2007) 
(defining the Guidelines as guidelines jointly issued by the Justice Department and the 
Federal Trade Commission which set forth case selection criteria that both agencies use 
when screening mergers for potential challenge under section 7 of the Clayton Act, and 
stating that the “[g]uidelines employ a basic five-part analysis to determine whether a 
particular merger threatens to create or further entrench market power”). 
 92. See Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363-64 (holding that “the concentration of 
firms . . . is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be 
enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have 
such anticompetitive effects”) (emphases added). 
 93. See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 377 
(recognizing two aspects of market structure that the court thought might well rebut the 
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that probably will not be clear until the next Supreme Court rendezvous 
with a merger, it appears that the structural presumption has definitely 
been weakened, but nevertheless stands as controlling doctrine. 
It has been said that the modern era of merger policy began with the 
1982 Merger Guidelines.94  The current guidelines were issued jointly 
by the DOJ and the FTC in 1992 and revised a little bit in 1997.95  They 
are limited to horizontal mergers—not vertical mergers, not 
conglomerate mergers.96  Reflecting the influence of the Chicago 
School,97 they focus on market power as the source of concern, and they 
don’t talk about trends of concentration, as Justice Brennan did, or 
protection of small business, which was one of the objectives of some of 
the earlier merger decisions.98
presumption raised by concentration, one of which included new entry). 
 94. See Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving 
Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 148 
(2002) (stating that the same problem that William Baxter confronted in drafting the 
1982 Merger Guidelines—”harmonizing the older structural-era decisions with 
contemporary economic thinking—remains central to horizontal merger analysis 
today”). 
 95. See Robert M. Vernail, One Step Forward, One Step Back: How the Pass-on 
Requirement for Efficiencies Benefits in FTC v. Staples Undermines the Revisions to the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines Efficiencies Section, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 133, 134 
(1998) (stating that “[i]n April 1997, the FTC and DOJ issued revisions to the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ Efficiencies Section”). 
 96. See Joseph P. Bauer, Symposium, The 1982 Merger Guidelines: Government 
Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte Blanche for Conglomerate 
Mergers?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 348, 350 (1983) (stating that in 1982 the “Department of 
Justice promulgated new Merger Guidelines, indicating that it will not challenge non-
horizontal mergers, unless the transactions are likely to have an adverse impact on 
actual or potential competition”). 
 97. The “Chicago School” refers to “the approach of the members of the 
Department of Economics at the University of Chicago over the past century . . . 
associated with a particular brand of economics which adheres strictly to Neoclassical 
price theory in its economic analysis, “free market” libertarianism in much of its policy 
work and a methodology which is relatively averse to too much mathematical 
formalism and willing to forego careful general equilibrium reasoning in favor of more 
results-oriented partial equilibrium analysis.” History of Economic Thought, The 
Chicago School, http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/chicago.htm (last visited May 1, 
2008). 
 98. See Baker, supra note 94, at 147 (stating that a Chicago-oriented legal scholar, 
William Baxter, appointed by President Reagan to head the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice, issued the 1982 Merger Guidelines where “he confronted the 
problem of harmonizing the existing horizontal merger precedent with the economic 
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The guidelines proceed in five steps to summarize its defining 
markets and examine market competition: adverse competitive effects, 
entry, efficiencies, and the possibility that one of the firms is failing.99  
Merger law is concerned with predicting the competitive effects of a 
merger.  It is presumed that when there is market power, there will be 
negative competitive effects.100  Going back one step further, it is 
presumed that when there is a high market share, there will be market 
power.101  A crucial link in the inquiry is whether the merging parties 
will have a high market share.102
This is not always an easy question to answer.  In fact, it’s usually 
the nub of a merger antitrust analysis.  For instance, there is a pending 
merger between XM and Sirius.103  It will go from a duopoly to a 
monopoly if the market is defined as satellite radio.  The parties argue 
that is not the relevant market, because there is also AM and FM, and 
there are other types of communications with which they say they 
compete.  That is going to be the issue that the Justice Department has to 
determine: What is the relevant market? 
Whole Foods wants to acquire Wild Oats.104  These are the two 
primary competitors in the organic/natural foods market.  The merger 
would create a near-monopoly in that market.  But is that the relevant 
market?  They were able to convince a district court that the market is 
actually much broader.  It includes Safeway and Kroger’s and all the 
approach of the Chicago School”). 
 99. Mr. Foer failed to name the fifth step, which is “significantly increase 
concentration and result in a concentrated market.” See 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552-01 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Notice], available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
 100. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) (holding that 
“[s]ection 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest the anticompetitive effects of 
market power in their incipiency”). 
 101. See Notice, supra note 99 (stating that when the post-merger Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index exceeds 1800 points, “it will be presumed that mergers producing an 
increase in the HHI of more than 100 points are likely to create or enhance market 
power . . . .”). 
 102. See id. (stating that a federal agency will first assess “whether the merger 
would significantly increase concentration and result in a concentrated market”). 
 103. See Frank McGuire, Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2007, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 2, 2008, at R12.  The DOJ approved the merger on March 24, 2008, leaving only 
one more regulatory hurdle—approval from the FCC. Sarah McBride & Amy Schatz , 
XM, Sirius Move Closer To Improbable Merger, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2008 at B1. 
 104. David Kesmodel, Whole Foods Sets Probe As CEO Apologizes, WALL ST. J., 
July 18, 2007, at A3. 
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other places where you can buy organic foods, even though they don’t 
specialize in them. 
We’ll see.  That’s on appeal by the FTC. 
The question is which close substitutes are close enough so that 
they should be considered to be in the same market?  Under the 
guidelines, we begin the market-definition process by accounting for the 
possibility that buyers would defeat an attempt by sellers to profitably 
exercise market power because they will purchase close substitutes from 
alternative sellers. 
The technique used for this is kind of hypothetical.  It is the process 
of the hypothetical monopolist.  You are trying to define a market as a 
collection of products or services that would form a valuable monopoly 
within a defined geographic region.  Were the hypothetical monopolist 
in this market to raise the price by a small but significant and non-
transitory amount, which is usually considered to be 5% for the 
foreseeable future105—would enough potential substitutes flow into the 
market so that the price would come back down to where it was before 
the monopolist raised the price?  If the answer is yes, enough would 
flow in, then you have defined the market too narrowly.  We have to go 
back and try a broader definition and do the same test, until we come to 
a market that is defined in such a way that a monopolist in that market 
could maintain its price increase.  Then we have the right definition.  
That’s the way this process works. 
In Philadelphia National Bank, the market was a cluster of services, 
such as loans and other types of credit, deposit accounts, checking 
services, trust administration.106  The Court said, “Yes, that cluster is 
distinct, and it represents cost advantages and consumer preference.  We 
think that that is a viable definition of a market.”107  They were not 
going through the guidelines test at that time, because it didn’t exist.108
Once you have the market defined satisfactorily, the next step is to 
figure out who the participants are in the market.  The guidelines count 
as firms participating in the market all firms that currently produce or 
sell in the market.109  This is not always obvious.  For example, in a 
 105. See Notice, supra note 99, § 1.11.
 106. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). 
 107. See id. at 356-57. 
 108. Compare id. at 321 (stating that Phila. Nat’l Bank was decided on June 17, 
1963), with Baker, supra note 94, at 148 (stating that the modern era of merger 
regulation began with the creation of the 1982 Merger Guidelines). 
 109. See Notice, supra note 99, § 1.2. 
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commercial bank merger, what do you do about thrifts?  Are they in the 
market, not in the market, or partially in the market?  It depends.  In a 
retail product market, the thrift and the credit union deposits are given 
full weight, because they are alternatives for the customer.  But in the 
small business lending market, less credit, or maybe no credit, would be 
given to thrifts and credit unions. 
For the most part, DOJ investigation of a commercial bank merger 
is generally similar to its other merger investigations.110  One difference 
is that they have an unusually large amount of information because of 
regulatory oversight of banks.111  The DOJ staff usually requests 
information that it needs through a simple request for information, rather 
than a civil investigative demand.112
Unlike other mergers, a bank merger receives antitrust immunity 
after the post-approval waiting period expires.113  In other words, if the 
DOJ and the regulatory agency both approve it, nobody else can go after 
it.114  If the DOJ does file suit, there is an automatic stay, and a federal 
district court will conduct a de novo review of the transaction.115
The geographic market determination116 in this area tends to be 
more of an issue than the product market determination.117  The starting 
point for the DOJ is the Federal Reserve Board-defined banking 
market.118  The geographic market definition will probably depend on 
the product market at issue.  In retail banking, it is generally going to be 
defined by the customers—where they live, where they work.  For small 
businesses, customers generally choose a bank that is within a few miles 
of their business location.  The geographic market for middle-market 
 110. See Bejerana, supra note 60, at 160. 
 111. See Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive 
Quest for Deregulation, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 1 (2006). 
 112. See Yvonne S. Quinn, Practical Aspects of Defending Bank Mergers Before 
The Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Justice, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 91, 94 
(1993). 
 113. See Kramer, supra note 59, at 116. 
 114. See Killian, supra note 56, at 857. 
 115. See Kramer, supra note 59, at 116. 
 116. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963) (defining the 
relevant geographic market as the section of the country “in which to appraise the 
probable competitive effects” of a proposed merger). 
 117. See id. (defining the relevant product market as the line of commerce “in which 
to appraise the probable competitive effects” of a proposed merger). 
 118. See generally Killian, supra note 56 (explaining the process that the Fed and 
the DOJ use to analyze a bank merger). 
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customers is going to be larger than for small businesses; for very large 
banks, it could be international.  Critically, though, the market definition 
is not set in concrete.  A new method of doing business might trigger a 
change in market definition. 
Let’s take Wal-Mart, for instance.  Traditionally, Wal-Mart was not 
considered to be a supermarket, or in the same market with 
supermarkets.  So when two supermarkets wanted to merge, Wal-Mart, 
operating through a different channel of distribution and with a whole 
different style, was excluded.  That made it somewhat difficult for large 
supermarkets to merge, because, at least in some geographic areas, they 
would have a high share of the market.  If you include Wal-Mart as a 
supermarket, or within that food retailing market, and you say that is the 
relevant market and Wal-Mart is bigger than any of the others, you have 
a whole different picture. 
There is some indication that this is going to happen.  It did happen 
in a settlement the FTC reached in Puerto Rico when Wal-Mart entered 
the market.119  If you shift your paradigm of market definition and you 
include Wal-Mart in the market, then the ability of large supermarkets to 
merge becomes much greater.  The point is that we can have all kinds of 
changes that might lead to a different definition of a market.  The 
changes could involve transportation costs, consumer buying habits, 
technological advancements, governmentally-established barriers to 
entry, and patterns of trade.  All of these are possibilities.  There is a 
major monopolization case going on right now in which AMD is suing 
Intel.120  The complaint describes the relevant geographic market as 
nothing less than global.121  As the world changes, market definitions 
can expand or, in some cases, shrink. 
If the accepted geographic market for commercial banks were to be 
enlarged by merger analysis from local to regional, national, or global, 
the levels of concentration would in many situations fall below the 
thresholds that give today’s antitrust enforcers concern.  Similarly, if the 
 119. See Orson Swindle, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Before the 126th 
Annual Meeting of the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/swindle/030123osremarks.shtm (stating that “the 
Commission announced its acceptance of a consent agreement in settlement of its 
challenge to Wal-Mart’s acquisition of Supermercados Amigo, the largest supermarket 
chain in Puerto Rico”). 
 120. See Complaint at 1, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., Civ. Action 
No. 05-441-JJF (D. Del. June 27, 2005). 
 121. See id. 
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line between commercial banks and non-banking financial institutions is 
weakened, the product market definition could change.  Banks that are 
very large ducks in today’s banking pond could appear much smaller to 
the expanded financial lake.  In either case, the adoption of a new and 
enlarged market definition would open the way to new and potentially 
much larger institutions.  Needless to say, the implications would be 
both enormous and enormously controversial. 
There is ample justification for careful and ongoing empirical 
research to test the accuracy of both prevalent and alternative 
assumptions.  Consolidation that has created national banking and 
ongoing changes in banking services do assure us that antitrust analysts 
will have to continue to visit and revisit the assumptions relating to 
market definition, to participants in the market, and to the role of 
concentration in commercial markets. 
Given the importance of empirical research and what economics 
has to tell us about these matters, it’s appropriate to turn the table over to 
Anne now. 
DR. GRON: Thank you.  I am going to be speaking more about the 
economic side of the market.  This discussion is really going to focus on 
retail banking.  In the current implementation of the 1963 Supreme 
Court ruling, and subsequent judgments upon the matter, bank mergers 
at the retail banking services level are primarily analyzed in terms of 
their geography and product line.122  The initial analysis is typically that 
the geographic market is, in fact, local and that the product line is this 
cluster of retail branch banking services that include demand deposits 
and lending. 
Implementation, as a first pass, is a pretty standardized process for 
bank mergers.  However, there are slight variations in implementation at 
a screening level—when they initially propose a merger and how 
regulators may look at them and evaluate them. 
What we know from economic research, in terms of what we can 
discern about the size of relevant markets, depends, in some ways, on 
the product.  The particular product may suggest a narrower or broader 
market.  The nice thing about the research is that it’s not just an “it 
 122. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (defining the 
geographic markets where the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and 
immediate); see also United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666 (1974) 
(stating that geographic markets are described as the area in which the acquired bank 
was in direct competition with other banks). 
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depends” answer; it’s actually an answer that provides some insight into 
the types of products and the size of the markets. 
What is a typical bank merger process?  In the beginning of the 
process the geographic market, if urban, is typically going to be defined 
as the metropolitan area.  For rural areas, it’s typically going to be one 
county, maybe two, depending on where the population and the bank 
branches in those counties tend to be.  Initially, the product lines 
probably receive the most focus are deposits or loans.123
Merger analysis is typically based on the Department of Justice 
Merger Guidelines124 and by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index,125 which 
is really just a measure of market concentration.  The typical way to 
measure concentration in a market is a concentration ratio.126  For 
example, a concentration ratio for the top four banks would tell you 
what percent of market share the top four banks have.  But if you have a 
concentration ratio of 40, you don’t know, for the top four banks, 
whether each one has 10% or whether one bank has 35% and the next 
three have the remaining 5%. 
As an economist judging the performance of this market, you care 
about the difference.  The Herfindahl Index provides a better index in 
those terms, because it is the square of the market shares.  As such, a 
larger market share, when it gets squared, gets proportionately larger.  
That is why we use a Herfindahl Index. 
A 200-point increase in the Herfindahl caused by the merger and a 
post-merger Herfindahl of 1800 or more is often seen as reason to look 
further.127  You look at whether the ease of entry and exit is going to 
 123. FDIC, FDIC STATEMENT OF POLICY ON BANK MERGER TRANSACTIONS 5145 
(2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-1200.html (stating 
that “[t]he relevant geographic market(s) includes the areas in which the offices to be 
acquired are located and the areas from which those offices derive the predominant 
portion of their loans, deposits, or other business”). 
 124. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW—
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW (2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/647 
2.pdf. 
 125. See Saylor, supra note 37. 
 126. Concentration ratio is a percentage figure representing the aggregate market 
share of a given number of leading firms in an industry. See Michael O. Finkelstein & 
Richard M. Friedberg, The Application of an Entropy Theory of Concentration to the 
Clayton Act, 76 YALE L.J. 677 (1967) (stating that the measure of economic 
concentration most frequently used by lawyers and economists in the horizontal merger 
cases is the concentration ratio). 
 127. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
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have an impact on the competition among the banks that result from the 
merger.  You also look at the types of business in which those particular 
banks are engaged.  A separate issue is whether the concentration of 
deposits that results from this merger gives the merging entity over 35% 
of the deposits in the market, which would also result in further scrutiny.  
It doesn’t mean that is the end of the process; it just means that there 
will be more of the process. 
One difference between the different regulatory bodies, to some 
extent, is the initial firms that each might include in the market.  The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC typically 
include thrifts at full measure.128  If they have $100 in assets, the $100 is 
included in the market and included in their shares.  The Federal 
Reserve Board, in contrast, often includes a thrift deposit at 50% 
weight.129  If they have $100, it’s going to be in at $50.  The Department 
of Justice might include the thrifts in the deposit.130  It depends on the 
basic size of the thrift competition in that market. 
The research is best grouped into three areas.  The first type of 
research basically looks at markets defined by “use.”  It looks at surveys 
of households and small businesses, and asks, “Where do you get your 
financial transactions?”  If you get your financial transactions from the 
set of banks within the local geographic area, as just defined—based on 
either a metropolitan area or a county—then the local measure is a pretty 
good measure of the market structure.  If, however, you are getting a fair 
amount of your financial services from outside that market, then clearly 
you don’t have all the firms within the market.  The size of the market is 
correctly defined when you have a market such that a monopolist 
operating in the market could raise and hold prices higher by 5%, 
because if you have a lot of customers doing business with firms outside 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (stating 
that “[t]ransactions that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in concentrated 
markets presumptively raise antitrust concerns . . . .”). 
 128. See KEITH R. FISHER, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF BANKS AND SAVINGS 
INSTITUTIONS § 3.12, at 3:91-92 (1993). 
 129. Robert B. Avery and Katherine A. Samolyk, Bank Consolidation and Small 
Business Lending: The Role of Community Banks 19 n.16 (FDIC Working Paper No. 
2003-05, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/wp2003_05/ 
wp2003_05.pdf. 
 130. See generally Robert E. Litan, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice, Address before Antitrust Section of ABA on the Antitrust Assessment of Bank 
Mergers (Apr. 6, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/litan.txt. 
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of your local market structure, you clearly don’t have all the competitive 
effects. 
The second set of research looks at the determinants of prices—that 
is, interest rates, not the fees per se.  It looks at price variation over a 
larger geographic area, and asks, “Are prices seemingly most influenced 
by local market conditions—the structure, the profitability of businesses, 
and so forth—or are they also influenced by larger economic conditions 
over a larger geographic area, like statewide or, in some cases, 
national?” 
There are a couple of studies that are closely related to this 
question.  The market structure analysis really asks how well different 
types of financial institutions compete with each other or, more 
importantly from an antitrust standpoint, how important is the 
competitive effect of one type of financial institution on another.  A 
Herfindahl Index or a concentration ratio weighs all firms similarly.  If 
you decided to weigh the thrifts at 50%, everybody is either full-weight 
or 50%.  In reality, firms are differentiated.  This market structure 
analysis tries to look at in what way financial institutions are 
differentiated and learn something about their competitive influences on 
each other. 
Finally, some relatively new research looks at the prices of bank 
branch sales and asks whether these are influenced by local market 
conditions or whether they are influenced more by state market 
conditions.  The survey data addresses whether households or small 
businesses do most of their financial transactions with geographically 
local banks.  The answer has been that it depends on the type of product.  
For consumers, checking and NOW accounts131 remain primarily local.  
Most consumers and households get their transaction accounts at banks 
within a small local geographic market.  That said, the percentage of 
households getting all their financial services from banks has fallen 
significantly over time.132  The research I saw tended to stop as of the 
late 1990s, but I think we can strongly expect the trends to continue.  For 
 131. NOW stands for Negotiable Order of Withdrawal. See James D. Lawlor, Power 
of Savings Bank or Similar Institution to Provide Checking Facilities or Negotiable 
Orders of Withdrawal (NOW) to Customers, 64 A.L.R.3d 1314 (1975). 
 132. Dr. Anne Gron, Bank Merger Analysis: Defining the Relevant Market (Nov. 
13, 2007) (unpublished PowerPoint slides, on file with the Fordham Journal of 
Corporate and Financial Law). 
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example, by 1998, less than 45% of the households in the surveys 
borrowed locally.133  That is likely to continue. 
This isn’t that surprising.  Borrowing is something that, because of 
the significant cost to consumers, they are going to search for pretty far.  
Meanwhile, transaction accounts are something that you might want 
locally, because you are coming in and out of the bank and have a lot of 
interactions with them. 
For small businesses, the research gives a little more of a mixed 
message.  Research from the mid-1990s suggested that distances 
between borrowers and lenders may have increased and, in fact, are 
currently likely to be larger than a local geographic market.134  
Specifically, the study looked at a survey of small business lending, and 
it found that distances between borrowers and their lenders in the 1970s 
were relatively close to a local market.135  They were about seventy 
miles apart, on average, whereas by the early 1990s, research indicated 
that they were closer to 160 miles away, which is larger than most 
geographically local markets.136  The challenge, however, is that we 
don’t have a lot of data from the 1970s.  We only observed agreements 
made in the 1970s in the 1990s, so you have some bias. 
Like good academics, people ran off and asked the question again.  
The next study basically came out somewhat contradictory.  While the 
distance between small business borrowers and their lenders varied 
according to the type of product, small business borrowers much like 
households get their transaction accounts locally, too.  Regarding lines 
of credit, another measure of lending investigated, small businesses 
typically transact with financial institutions within about thirty miles or 
so, and have not increased in distance throughout the 1990s.137  This 
study concluded that, on average, small businesses get a lot of their 
 133. See id. 
 134. See FED. RESERVE BD., 1993 NATIONAL SURVEY OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCES 
(1993), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/Oss/oss3/bibliography/index.h 
tml (providing various reports and memoranda summarizing the 1993 survey results and 
their impact). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See FED. RESERVE BD., 1998 NATIONAL SURVEY OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCES 
(1998), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/Oss/Oss3/ssbf98/ssbf98hom 
e.html (providing various reports and memoranda summarizing the 1998 survey results 
and their impact). 
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financial services from local markets, and that this has not changed over 
time.138
A second set of research asked, “Do we have all the banks in the 
market?”  Using some information from the Community Reinvestment 
Act,139 researchers looked at how many banks were providing credit for 
small businesses within a local geographic area.  They found that, while 
a lot of the relationships were with local banks, a number of banks were 
excluded.  In particular, they tended to be large, multimarket bank types.  
The excluded lending was also typically credit card-related. 
If you include these banks, the measure of concentration falls 
significantly in the market area.  It tends to be that the share of outside 
banks in this sort of measure is greater in more concentrated markets.  If 
you are looking in a market where you might be particularly concerned 
that concentration would affect pricing and profitability within the 
market, interestingly enough, those are the markets which seem to have 
more use of outside credit by small businesses. 
There is also a branch of literature that looks at price determination 
within a market.  This question basically asks, “Are interest rates 
reflective of concentration?”  The structure-performance paradigm140 
really underlies much of the antitrust analysis.  If you are looking at an 
industry that is very concentrated, the likelihood that competition is very 
intense is less than when you have lots of small firms all acting 
atomistically in the sort of standard, perfectly competitive world.  Under 
that scenario, a competitive market would likely have low prices and 
low profitability and be very efficient.  A very concentrated market is 
likely to lead to conduct that is less competitive among firms and likely 
to lead to higher profitability.  This research looked for both the 
connection between prices and profitability, and also the difference 
between prices and concentration. 
Early research found a very a surprising result.  Deposit interest 
rates—remember, the higher the deposit interest rate, the better it is for 
the consumer—were positively related to concentration measures, which 
would suggest that maybe concentrated markets are better, from a 
consumer standpoint.141  This turns out to be an artifact of that particular 
 138. See id. 
 139. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (1997). 
 140. The structure-conduct-performance approach to antitrust analysis sets elements 
of performance as the main goals. See Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-
Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1104 (1979). 
 141. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Symposium, Is Antitrust Anticompetitive?, 9 HARV. 
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study, and later researchers have been unable to replicate it.  In fact, they 
have overturned the results.142
Typically, you look at interest rates on local and state or national 
measures and ask, “Is a variation in prices most related to local 
concentration and local structure, or is it also influenced, or more 
influenced, by state level?”  Again, you get some variation on the local.  
State measures actually explain a fair amount of the variation.  Similar 
to the survey data, prices and interest rates on local transaction accounts 
appear to be heavily locally determined.  However, if you look at 
something like six-month certificates of deposit that are pretty liquid and 
fairly easy to price, their rates seem much more nationally determined. 
The evidence suggests that most deposit rates are, not positively, 
but negatively, correlated with concentration, meaning you get lower 
interest rates on your deposits if you are in a more concentrated 
market.143  But prices are going to be influenced by state and super-
regional effects, not just by the local market. 
This research went further and actually looked at different types of 
banks.  This is particularly important when you think about 
concentration measures as treating all banks and all products within 
them uniformly.  This research has separated two kinds of commercial 
banks—banks that participate across multiple markets, which we 
generally call multimarket banks, and single-market banks.  The bulk of 
the assets in the U.S. banking system are in multimarket banks. When 
you separate them and look at them individually, it turns out that 
multimarket banks don’t set prices at individual market levels.144  They 
set policies for interest rates and so forth that go across local markets.  
They do not vary that much with local market conditions. 
Do the multimarket bank interest rates charged or given on different 
kinds of financial instruments just represent a weighted average of the 
places these banks are in?  The answer is actually no.  They more 
closely represent the statewide conditions than simply the weighted 
average of the local conditions these banks are in.  In contrast, single-
market banks actually do seem to price to the locality.145  They reflect 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277, 286-87 (1986). 
 142. See id. at 287. 
 143. See id. at 286-87. 
 144. See Andrew M. Cohen & Michael J. Mazzeo, Market Structure and 
Competition Among Retail Depository Institutions, REV. OF ECON. AND STATISTICS, 
Feb. 2007, at 60, 61 n.3. 
 145. See id. 
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the local market conditions, not as much the state conditions.  In fact, 
deposit rates are lower when market concentration is higher. 
Interestingly enough, the two types of banks do compete against 
each other and have an effect on each other.  The relationship between 
the deposit rates and local market concentration is weaker when 
multimarket banks are very strong in the market, suggesting that they are 
going to have a significant disciplinary effect on each other. 
One important caveat: this structure-performance paradigm is really 
about concentration leading to, eventually, higher profits because of less 
intense competition.  It is difficult to fully know whether the differences 
in prices reflect differences in quality or whether they reflect differences 
in both quality and costs that are systematically different among the 
different types of banks. 
That’s where these other studies are attractive.  These other studies 
try to work in an environment where they don’t look at prices per se.  
They have underlying a model of profitability and they then observe 
something else in the world.  Based on their underlying model of 
profitability, they infer something either about competition or about the 
value of a certain thing. 
The first type of study I call market-structure studies.146  These 
studies use the composition of a market to analyze the competition 
within and across financial institutions.147  This is supposed to answer, 
“How competitive is the market?,” beyond just, “What’s the 
concentration ratio?  What’s the Herfindahl Index?”  They want to look 
at the players, look at how they interact.  How important is it that you 
have one thrift, two single-market banks, one multimarket bank, versus 
two multimarkets and two single-markets?  What kind of a difference 
might it make? 
To do this, you basically need geographically isolated markets.  
They have typically been done in rural markets, which is a sacrifice, 
because you are not going to be able to transfer these results as naturally 
to an urban market.  But with that sacrifice comes a benefit, in that you 
can then look at the number of firms in the market and the types of firms 
in the market.  You look at the variation across the markets and the 
market size, and if these firms are in the market and no more, then we 
 146. For an explanation of market-structure studies, see Almarin Phillips, Market 
Concentration and Performance: A Survey of the Evidence, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1099, 1105 (1986). 
 147. See id. 
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know that these guys are profitable.  Putting in one more of any of those 
types, the marginal guy is going to be unprofitable.  What can we infer 
about the effect of competition of one type versus another? 
This research has identified multimarket banks, single-market 
banks, and thrifts.  Thrifts are probably the most differentiated—not a 
surprise, given that the history of thrifts has been somewhat different 
than the history of commercial banks, in terms of the product markets 
and the things in which they were involved.  They have less of a 
competitive effect on single- and multimarket banks, except in the rural 
markets that are closer to urban markets.  The study defined less rural 
and more rural markets, depending on whether you were closer to a 
larger city than not. 
Multimarket and single-market banks are closer substitutes in the 
more rural markets.  They definitely have competitive effects on each 
other.  An additional single-market bank, however, does not have as big 
an effect on an existing multimarket bank as an additional multimarket 
bank.  They are not perfect substitutes in terms of the profitability of 
these kinds of institutions. 
What does it say about merger analysis?  It says that you have to 
think about the composition of the market, not just the number of 
players in the market.  Again, it depends on the product lines. 
The last type of study I want to mention looks at branch sales,148 
instead of prices, which could be influenced by quality or cost 
differences across firms.  If somebody is going to buy this branch, they 
are going to be willing to pay an amount that should reflect the 
profitability that this asset should generate.  The question is, “Does that 
profitability depend on local market conditions—how concentrated that 
local market is—or does that price reflect state or super-regional market 
structure or market conditions?” 
Any price is the outcome of a bargaining situation.  Prices are going 
to be higher if the seller has more bargaining power, if the potential 
synergies are very large, and if the buyer is more interested in the 
product and there are multiple bidders.  When you have competition for 
an asset, price goes up.  When you have less competition bidding, price 
goes down.  With that in mind, however, the research suggests that 
branch prices are correlated with state, not local, factors.149  The 
 148. See Martin R. Garay, III, New Developments in Savings and Loan Law, 39 
BUS. LAW. 781, 791-91 (1984). 
 149. See TIMOTHY H. HANNAN & ROBIN A. PRAGER, FED. RESERVE BD., 
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inference is that profitability is not a locally based event.  It’s actually 
something that depends on the market conditions at the state level. 
Remember, when you are looking at a branch, you are looking at a 
cluster of products, some of which may be more local, some of which 
may be serving a broader market.  You again come back to this issue 
that when you are looking at a specific merger, you want to consider the 
products that are most effective at that time. 
So what do we learn?  First, many markets for banks appear to be 
broader than a narrow local geography—although NOW and checking 
accounts are not—and they appear to be getting broader.  Second, there 
are significant variations in competitors and competition, both within 
and across markets.  There is room for people to discuss—jobs for 
lawyers, jobs for economists.  Third, the relevant market is likely to shift 
as the composition of competitors within markets shifts.  That is 
particularly important because there has been a lot of consolidation in 
the U.S. banking industry, and to the extent multimarket banks are going 
to continue to increase their market presence, you are going to get a 
change in how pricing occurs.  To the extent multimarket banks price 
over a larger area than single-market banks, there will continue to be 
changes in the breadth of markets considered for competition. 
Some trends exist in the marketplace that are likely to influence the 
nature of the relevant market as we continue forward.  Financial services 
are no longer one-stop shops.  They are no longer all together.  With 
securitization,150 you can see how many parts of the mortgage process 
have been unbundled. 
Banks, up to this point, have not been able to identify the potential 
switchers from locked-in consumers.  Locked-in consumers are, of 
course, the ones for which you can potentially raise price and create a 
niche market, where you will price-discriminate and charge them more 
than the potential switchers.  To the extent that banks or other financial 
institutions will be able to identify the switchers from the locked-in 
consumers in the future, you will get this kind of differentiation in your 
MULTIMARKET BANK PRICING: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF DEPOSIT INTEREST 
RATES 1 (2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200438/200 
438pap.pdf (stating that a study found that for multimarket banks, state level 
concentration is more strongly and consistently related to deposit interest rates than 
local market concentration). 
 150. For a definition and discussion of securitization, see Claire A. Hill, 
Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996). 
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products—one aimed at the group that is locked in and one aimed at the 
group that is more likely to switch. 
There have also been huge changes in information availability, 
which is particularly pertinent for financial institutions.  Obviously, the 
information provided by the Internet is going to tend to increase the 
market size and to have a significant price effect.  The six-month CD is 
a great example.  To the extent that it’s easy to get the information about 
what interest rate is being offered in what location, you are going to put 
your money where the highest interest can be earned rather than a local 
market.  Having that information at low cost is going to just increase the 
extent to which that’s true.  Internet access to banking came along a little 
slower than some people might have thought, but it is still growing.  It is 
definitely going to have an effect on how you would define a local 
market and the competition among players. 
Almost all households with a bank account have at least one 
electronic fund feature.  Many are not things that we would worry about 
as having significant effects on the market structure—like direct deposit.  
However, in 2003, 32% of households reported using computer 
banking,151 up from 4% in 1995.152  The early adopters were 
characterized by higher incomes, more financial assets, younger heads 
of household.153  They were less than fifty-five years old.154  They had 
more formal education, on average.155
Now that we have expanded to about 32%, the surveys suggest that 
the users of computer banking are actually much more diverse than one 
might have predicted.  A typical prediction would be that the people 
using computer banking would stay younger and stay within the higher-
income group, because they would have easier access to computers.  
Interestingly enough, it’s much more diverse in terms of age.156  
Researchers commented that they were older than they thought they 
would be.  Education of household head has changed a lot, too.157  As 
 151. See Christoslav E. Anguelov et al., U.S. Consumers and Electronic Banking, 
1995-2003, Fed. Res. Bull. (Winter 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/bulletin/2004/winter04_ca.pdf. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
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we move forward, that is going to have an impact on how you want to 
think about the relevant market. 
Securitization is what I consider predominantly an effect.  
Securitization reduces the cost of rapidly expanding loans and changes 
the dynamics of the competition.  It is also important in terms of the 
market structure.  Securitization has been around for a long time.  There 
has been tons of experience with government-sponsored entities like 
Freddie Mac158 and Ginnie Mae159 and Fannie Mae160 for the 
conforming mortgages.  But that is for your typical mortgage.  Of 
interest is that there has really been an expansion of the use of 
securitization into other forms of credit lending—for example, 
subprime161 and jumbos.162  Auto loans are in there; student loans are in 
there; credit card securitization is in there.  All kinds of lending has been 
subject to securitization. 
What does that do to the local market structure?  First of all, it has 
contributed to an unbundling of the lending process.  Brokers specialize 
in originating loans.  Lenders are no longer just banks; they include non-
bank firms, firms organized as REITs,163 firms organized as specialty 
financial organizations.  Specialized firms service the loans, and so on 
and so forth.  By having outside investors provide the liquidity, you are 
no longer tied to the deposits in your marketplace in the same way—
hence, breaking that link between your concentration of deposits and 
what you might be doing in terms of the lending side of the market. 
 158. For more information, please visit the Freddie Mac website, 
http://www.freddiemac.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
 159. For more information, please visit the Ginnie Mae website, 
http://www.ginniemae.gov (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
 160. For more information, please visit the Fannie Mae website, 
http://www.fanniemae.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
 161. See R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Subprime Lending, Suboptimal Bankruptcy: A 
Proposal to Amend §§ 522(F)(1)(B) and 548(A)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code to 
Protect Subprime Mortgage Borrowers and Their Unsecured Creditors, 38 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 81 (2006) (defining a subprime mortgage as a loan catered to higher risk 
borrowers). 
 162. See Wayne Passmore et al., GSEs, Mortgage Rates, and the Long-Run Effects 
of Mortgage Securitization 1 n.2 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2001-26, 
2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=275008. 
 163. REIT is short for real estate investment trust, which is a “financial vehicle that 
allows investors to pool their capital for participation in real estate ownership or 
mortgage financing.” Jack H. McCall, A Primer on Real Estate Trusts: The Legal 
Basics of REITs, 2 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 1, 2 (2001). 
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What does that do for your market analysis?  The presence of the 
secondary loan markets and other developments in structured finance 
means a lower cost of entry.  Not only are entry and exit already pretty 
easy in the banking industry, this makes it potentially much easier to 
enter at a much larger scale, quickly.  When there is an attractive profit 
opportunity—which might come about if a merger has reduced 
competition and prices have been raised and profitability is higher—it 
should be easier for a bank or another financial institution to expand its 
presence in a local market, in a lending market, if they have access to 
securitization.  Securitization is a force that is likely to reduce the cost of 
entry, providing the liquidity for lending and affecting loan rates, 
bringing prices back down, to the extent that concentration might have 
increased them. 
From a consumer perspective, securitization helps broaden the 
market.  It helps bring other competitors into the market.  It is 
particularly relevant for antitrust analysis when a merger may reduce the 
number of firms in particular markets.  For example, a recent merger 
was proposed between two of the largest student lenders in the 
business.164  The government is also a big contributor of student 
lending.165  There are many ways in which you might want to analyze 
this.  The fact that securitization is out there—it’s a profitable 
business—means that even though they are likely to increase 
concentration in the industry, there is going to be a significant offsetting 
effect of likely entry. 
Thank you. 
MR. BRODER: Thank you, Anne.  I think we have a few minutes, 
if there are any questions for Anne or Bert. 
QUESTION: Anne, as I understand it, deposits are really down in 
banks.  A deposit is really the other side of a loan.  How does it go into 
your analysis, that true deposits are way down from where they were 
years ago? 
DR. GRON: That’s a very good point.  When you talk about local 
banking, NOW accounts and checking accounts are still being held 
largely locally.  Casual empiricism says people you know have a local 
 164. See Press Release, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Chase Student Loans to Purchase 
Collegiate Funding Services, Creating a Comprehensive Education Finance (Student 
Lending) Business (Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://www.cfsloans.com/student-
loan/chase-student-loans-merger.html. 
 165. For more information, please visit the Federal Student Aid website, 
http://studentaid.ed.gov (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
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bank account, but the money gets parked there for a little bit and then it 
goes into a money market account somewhere or other places. 
That’s going to feed into the analysis, to the extent that other 
financial instruments are important for the local market—line of 
business again.  The local bank, by having transaction accounts available 
for you, is allowing you that ready access.  The fact that deposits are 
down just means that overall market size has declined over time.  
Profitability might be expected to decline.  You have to ask where are 
banks getting their other profits from?  How is the business model 
changing? 
I don’t think you can ask the question in isolation.  You have to 
look at the banking model as a whole.  To the extent that deposits alone 
were a big source of profits for banks and now they have declined in 
magnitude, clearly banks will be less profitable.  Some of the mergers 
might be caused by banks that are not doing as well as they used to.  
That is, again, part of the whole merger analysis that you can easily 
incorporate. 
QUESTION: When looking at the projected interest rates that will 
be paid on savings as a result of a merger, is there any weight to the 
argument that it’s better for a bigger bank, which is usually more highly 
concentrated, to pay higher interest rates than smaller banks that are 
probably adversely affected by the merger?  Larger banks are better 
regulated, and there is more competition for deposits that causes smaller 
banks to up the price on their deposits. 
MR. FOER: I think there is a false assumption in this conversation.  
The price that a bank offers for a service is some combination of interest 
and a variety of fees that hit from all different directions, making it very 
difficult to compare sometimes, but also making it somewhat of a false 
reference, if we are going to make judgments just on interest. 
It might be that large banks offer higher interest, but lower fees.  I 
don’t know.  I don’t know how to answer the question, but I am worried 
about the way we measure this.  We may not have any choice, because it 
gets too complicated. 
DR. GRON: Some of the research looks at a combination of 
average fees and interest rates.  You can’t measure exactly what you 
would like in all of these things.  You have to take it with a grain of salt.  
But your question is whether it’s better to have a large bank competing 
for consumers’ deposits because they can better manage the risk? 
QUESTIONER: Yes. 
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DR. GRON: There is the question of efficiency, whether a larger 
bank has lower costs, and whether that is offset in the consumers’ 
interest.  If they are that much more efficient, they may be able to offer 
consumers a better deal at the same time, by passing some of that on.  
But it’s not going to be the only reason.  You need a pretty strong 
efficiency argument to say that you are going to do better than some of 
the smaller banks. 
QUESTION: One thing shown in the credit crunch that we are 
facing today is that the bigger banks are not better “managers” in terms 
of the interest rates they charge.  In fact, some may have to be given 
back if there is a bailout of the type that took place in the S&L crisis.166  
You get 5% today, but if your taxes go up later on because they have to 
pay $250 billion or $1 trillion, then that is a phony interest rate.  We 
have had lots of mergers, and now enormously powerful banking 
institutions straddle the planet.167  When we talk about market power, 
we talk about a conscious act by a company that may be a monopoly or 
that can elbow people away.  The New York Times, on Sunday, had an 
article that if they are too big to fail, they are too big to manage.168  
Citicorp is $2.5 trillion.169
I don’t know whether this is a question or a comment. 
It seems that when you talk about market power and about mergers 
that lead to gargantuan institutions, the antitrust laws ought to have some 
room for the concept of dysfunctional power.  The same effect can take 
place.  It’s not that they are consciously elbowing people away, but they 
affect competition because of the damage they cause, for example, in the 
subprime. 
MR. FOER: There is a lot of stuff there, and you are hitting some 
very basic points about the way we deal with mergers and about the 
course of antitrust in the last thirty years.  The course of antitrust has 
 166. See Fred Galves, Might Does Not Make Right: The Call for Reform of the 
Federal Governments D’Oench, Duhme and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(E) Superpowers in 
Failed Bank Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1333-39 (1996) (stating that the U.S. 
government bailed out multiple failing savings and loan associations in the 1980s and 
1990s). 
 167. See generally Tim McCarthy, Refining Product Market Definition in the 
Antitrust Analysis of Bank Mergers, 46 DUKE L.J. 865 (1997). 
 168. Nelson D. Schwartz, Perhaps Too Many Acts in the Corporate Tent, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, § 4, at 5. 
 169. See Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citibank Agency and Trust Announces 
Opening of a New Office in Orange County, California (Oct. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.citibank.com/citigroup/press/2004/data/041012a.htm. 
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been determined by the Chicago School, where we focus on 
microeconomics, and in particular on short-term price effects—not 
completely, but largely, to the exclusion of other issues—which means 
aggregate concentration, the total amount of wealth in a small number of 
banks, is irrelevant.  That’s a political issue. 
This is the argument: If we wanted to deal with that, we would have 
to deal with it politically, through regulation.  But the predominant 
philosophy, at least for thirty years, has been that we don’t want to go 
that route.  We want the markets to prevail, for a variety of reasons.  
Laissez-faire is triumphant right now. 
That leads to this concentration movement that we are seeing in 
every industry.  New industries are invented and they bring new kinds of 
competition.  The Internet is going to have, and has already had, an 
impact on financial institutions and the way we borrow money.  Things 
are constantly changing.  The one consistency is the increase in 
concentration.  Where we used to worry about industries with six or ten 
major competitors, now we only worry about industries with three or 
four.  Two or one is a problem still.  The threshold of concern in 
antitrust enforcement today is more like a merger from four to three than 
from eight to seven, or even six to five. 
Ask the question, as a general matter: “Would you rather have 
industries, including banking, where there are eight or ten major players, 
as opposed to three?”  It’s not such an easy question, actually.  First of 
all, every industry is different.  Second, you may be giving up some 
important efficiencies if you opt for the eight to ten.  But there may be 
some benefits of the type to which you were alluding, perhaps, that are 
less quantifiable. 
It has to do with power, political power.  That’s one reason why 
commercial banking was separated from investment banking, why we 
had branching limitations and unit banking rules and so forth.  These 
were political decisions that were based not on how you achieve 
efficiency, but how you keep the economic power from getting too 
concentrated. 
We moved away from that, for a variety of reasons.  Maybe it’s 
time to move back in that direction a little bit.  I do think we are paying 
a price for having institutions that are too large—unnecessarily large.  
As I pointed out, above $50 billion, it does not appear that there are 
efficiency gains. 
DR. GRON: I would hesitate to want the government to be the 
decider of whether a company can manage itself well or not.  I think our 
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ability to assess that is imperfect at best.  As a management challenge, 
yes, big institutions are a challenge.  But I don’t think that the 
government or a set of standards is a better way to analyze that than the 
market.  Failures of organizations are perhaps the best discipline in 
telling people not to undertake certain types of endeavors.  Unless their 
money is on the line, they are not going to make the same kind of 
decision.  I don’t see why the government would make a better decision 
to start off with. 
I also observe that booms and busts have existed before 
concentration was high and they will exist whether concentration is high 
or not.  That is actually an aspect of the marketplace.  I definitely agree 
that the subprime mortgage situation170 is a mess.  I think that is an 
uncontroversial statement.  I don’t know if government intervention 
would help it particularly.  It’s going to be very costly to get out of.  I 
don’t think that concentration alone is going to prove to be the cause of 
the effect.  There are multiple things happening at the same time.  I think 
you can point to things that government did that may have contributed to 
it, not that the government is solely at fault. 
There are many things that happened that have led to that.  There 
has been an overall expansion of the use of credit.  There is something 
much larger than just a concentration in a couple of investment banks 
which, I agree, is high.  But it’s beyond something that we have 
discussed here.  To the extent that investment banks are very dominant 
in certain types of product lines, it’s really a different question when you 
look at their types of mergers as well. 
QUESTION: In retail banking, when you do your economic 
analysis, how much are you looking at the possibility that these 
structures which are based on market power and price might be 
undermined by a situation in which the user cannot figure out what the 
price is?  As an example, Chase Manhattan Bank, which has branches 
now every two blocks on the Upper West Side, put out a fifty-page 
bulletin about their fee structure, with twenty different kinds of banking 
retail packages, which was totally incomprehensible in terms of how 
much we would actually be paying.171
 170. See Painter, supra note 161. 
 171. For more information on the products, services and other information that 
would have been contained in the bulletin referenced by the speaker, please visit the 
Chase Online Banking website, http://www.chase.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
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DR. GRON: That’s a fantastic comment.  You are absolutely right.  
Economic models and economic analyses assume that consumers 
actually understand what they are charged.  What is also true is, whether 
people read that material or not, they don’t always seem to understand it. 
One would hope that over the course of actually engaging in those 
transactions, you would see whether you are spending more or less.  
When you get a fifty-page document—if you get a two-page document, 
with the size of type I get, there are about fifty pages in there—you can’t 
tell what it’s going to mean for you.  You start actually consuming the 
product, and then you find out whether things are more or less costly, 
just like whether you go to one grocery store or another.  They may be 
advertising a gallon of milk for a certain price, but it doesn’t tell you 
how much your particular basket of goods is going to come out costing. 
So banking is an experience good in that sense.  To the extent that 
they are charging you an interest rate and a set of fees, it’s the 
responsibility of the consumer to understand, at some point, what it’s 
costing them.  To the extent, over time, you don’t analyze that, that’s 
really something that the economic models would fail at.  We actually 
assume that either a consumer over time would understand that they are 
spending a lot or a competitor will come in and say, “Hey, guys, you’re 
spending, on average, this amount on your checking account.”  Then you 
get the simplified checking account solution guys coming in and telling 
you, “No.  Come to us.” 
Your cell phone also has that attribute, to some extent—maybe not 
yours; mine might.  Your car—you buy an inexpensive car.  It costs a 
fortune to fix it.  There are all those goods in life that have a certain 
experience to them.  What you are saying is that banking is no longer 
something that you can look at from the outside, understand the price 
it’s going to be, and just settle.  It’s something that, while you consume 
it, you are going to understand what it costs you and what the benefits 
are.  You are going to make your decision that way. 
MR. FOER: I would say that obfuscation is a strategy of 
differentiation.  If all you looked at were interest rates, what kind of 
competition would there be?  Everybody would have the same interest 
rate.  So you have to differentiate it, and one of the ways is through all 
these different fees and complications.  What it says to me is that 
consumer protection and antitrust have to go hand in hand.  Unless you 
have consumers who understand what they are buying, competition is 
affected. 
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I just went through an experience with securitized loans.  It was a 
commercial loan, where I was the borrower.  I started hearing things that 
I had never known anything about—conduit loans.  Those are loans 
created in such a way that they can be sent off in securitized packages 
and serviced by third parties out somewhere in the world.  I was told that 
there are certain risks to that.  If you get into a little bit of trouble and 
somebody is holding one of those loans, they don’t care anything about 
you; they are going to foreclose very quickly.  My benefit was that I 
went with somebody that didn’t do that, and I paid a little bit more.  This 
happened a couple of days before the bubble burst on the subprimes.172  
Instead of pulling the loan like they did with everybody else, I got the 
loan. 
Here’s the point.  This was an incredibly complicated transaction 
compared to the last time I did a refinancing of this sort, several years 
back.  Because of securitization, the loan documents are suddenly this 
thick.  They want all kinds of information, and there are all kinds of 
third-party charges.  The transaction costs of a loan—this was not a huge 
loan—were the same as if it was a $1 billion loan.  We are going to start 
seeing some kind of reaction to these increased transaction costs, as this 
whole process has gotten more and more complicated. 
On the other side, as we see more and more transactions on the 
Internet—when you borrow on the Internet or you buy something on the 
Internet—you are going to be confronted with these lengthy disclosure 
statements that you are not going to read.173  You can’t make the deal 
until you have checked that you have read it, and you will check.  That 
brings us into a whole new area, because you will be giving away rights 
left and right.  You will be required to arbitrate.  You might be required 
not to participate in class actions. 
We are going to have to resolve a lot of these questions that used to 
come under the rubric of a contract of adhesion, because these are all 
contracts of adhesion.  How we are going to make them, in some way, 
fair, or avoid the worst abuses that are likely?  This is a challenge that is 
going to affect banking and all other transactions. 
 172. See David Anderson, Year in Review 2007: The Subprime Lending Crisis, 71 
TEX. B.J. 20 (2008) (stating that the subprime bubble burst in 2007 when “housing 
prices fell in many parts of the country at the same time rates on many subprime loans 
adjusted upward and borrowers were required to start repaying principal”). 
 173. See generally Jeffrey P. Taft, Internet-Based Payment Systems: An Overview of 
the Regulatory and Compliance Issues, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 42 (2002). 
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MR. BRODER: That’s the end of our time.  Bert, thank you, and 
Anne.  I also want to thank Carl Felsenfeld, the Fordham Law School, 
and the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for sponsoring 
this.
